

S E C R E T

LA/COG-034/82

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director for Operations

FROM :   
Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : NSPG Meeting on Cuban Excludables

1. The CIA is in general agreement with the conclusions of the National Security Council that there are no inexpensive, easy, or guaranteed methods of forcing the Castro Government to take back the Cuban excludables.

a. The temporary resettlement of the excludables in third countries for possible future repatriation to Cuba is a non-starter. Even if we could find a third country willing to accept them temporarily, there would be even less of a chance that Castro would agree to readmit them into Cuba. If the excludables were "forced" on a third country involuntarily, e.g., Nicaragua, Grenada or Angola, there is no guarantee they would remain in that country and that they would not be reexported elsewhere. Moreover, the U.S. would in the process turn the excludables into human pawns and thus mimic the actions of the Castro Government which is far below our acceptable standards of behavior.

b. The forcible return of the excludables to Cuba with the overt use of the U.S. armed forces or the pre-announced placing of the excludables on a U.S. vessel and rendering it inoperable in Cuban territorial waters would run the risk of loss of life and most certainly would garner international opprobrium.

c. The deportation through or the incarceration at Guantanamo Naval Base would unduly jeopardize the security of the Base. Deportation via Guantanamo would violate our treaty with Cuba re the Base and risk Cuban retaliation in the form of a Mariel-type exodus focused on the base, thereby resulting in an unprecedented civilian takeover of a U.S. military facility. Incarceration of the excludables at Guantanamo would overwhelm base facilities, cause serious security problems, and still not insulate the excludables from U.S. court action ordering their freedom.

ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT  
ARE CLASSIFIED S E C R E T

2. Against this bleak scenario we agree with the NSC that the best hope from a cost-benefit analysis lies in some form of suasion. Against a backdrop of seeking delays in the release of the hard-core criminals from prison by delaying tactics in the U.S. court system, the U.S. could initiate either a hardline or a softline program of action to encourage the Castro Government to accept all or at least the hardened criminal element of the excludables.

a. Hardline program aimed at exploiting Cuba's economic and political vulnerabilities. Under this program we would inform the Castro Government that if it did not accept the return of all or some designated portion of the excludables, the U.S. would systematically implement a series of economic-political measures against Cuba aimed at exploiting their economic and political vulnerabilities.

b. Draw down frozen Cuban assets in U.S. banks estimated at at least \$50 million to fund the continued incarceration of the excludables. Cuba has no similar liquid U.S. assets frozen in Cuba against which to retaliate in kind.

c. Exploring the latitude and prerogatives the U.S. Government can legally exercise as sole legal claimant for expropriated U.S. properties in Cuba. For example, can the U.S. Government place liens on all Cuban-owned properties in non-communist countries or on Cuban exports to non-communist markets?

d. Escalate planned tightening of U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba such as reducing the tourist flow to Cuba from the U.S., discontinuing Air Cubana landing rights in the U.S., and banning future calls to U.S. ports by vessels doing business with Cuba, to name a few.

Politicize the Issue:

e. Raise the issue in all international fora ranging from the UN Security Council and the UN Commissions on refugees and on human rights to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, if possible, and in the non-aligned movement via U.S. allies in the Third World.

f. Restrict travel by Cuban officials in the U.S. to a fifty mile radius of New York and Washington. While Havana would most certainly retaliate in kind, Cuba would be the bigger loser given the relative scale of travels by the respective government officials.

g. Terminate the issuance of visas to visiting Cuban officials or extend such visas only on a one-for-fifty basis for every fifty excludables returned to Cuba.

S E C R E T

h. Request that Moscow intercede to resolve the issue with the U.S. in turn compromising on an important U.S.-Soviet bilateral issue as an inducement to the USSR.

i. Take up Mexican President Lopez Portillo's offer which has been endorsed by the Castro regime to arbitrate outstanding differences between Cuba and the U.S. In return, the U.S. could compromise on an important U.S.-Mexican bilateral issue as a further inducement to Mexico.

3. A softer and perhaps politically less desirable approach would be to "bribe" the Castro Government to accept the return of all or most of the excludables by offering Havana a mix of political and economic "carrots."

a. Offer Cuba U.S.-origin offshore oil exploration and drilling technology. A major Cuban oil find would reduce Cuba's economic problems and possibly some of its dependence on the USSR.

b. Offer Cuba a lump-sum payment of cash or its equivalent for each excludable returned, e.g., perhaps the annual cost of \$15,000 - \$20,000 to the U.S. to keep that excludable incarcerated in the U.S.

c. Accept into the U.S. a specified number -- say fifty -- of legal Cuban refugees, pre-screened by the U.S., for each of the criminals returned to Cuba. Such large disproportionate exchange ratios are not uncommon in prisoner of war exchanges.

d. Give hard assurances to Havana that the U.S. will not initiate military action against Cuba and/or Nicaragua.

e. Seek the extradition of Orlando Bosch from Venezuela to Cuba. Bosch is currently in prison on charges of sabotaging a Cuban airplane in 1976. The incident cost many Cuban lives and is a very emotional issue with the Cubans.

f. Attempt to arrange an exchange of Cuban POW's held by Unita forces in Angola for the return of some of the excludables to Cuba.

CONCUR:

25X1

\_\_\_\_\_  
Deputy Director for Operations

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

S E C R E T